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The Work of  the Special Investigations 
Committee 
R. K. Mautz 
In describing the work of  the Special Investigations Committee, I must 
assume that you already have some understanding of  the SEC Practice Section 
of  the American Institute of  Certified  Public Accountants, its purpose, 
structure, and self-regulatory  program. If  that is a false  assumption, there will 
be time for  questions during the evening. I warn you, however, that you ask at 
your own peril. My interest in this remarkable effort  is such that you may learn 
a great deal more than you ever wanted to know about the profession's  self-
regulatory program. 
Initiation of  the Special Investigations Committee 
When the AICPA's Division for  CPA Firms was first  created by resolution 
of  Council in 1977 with an SEC Practice Section and a Private Companies 
Practice Section, the organization of  the former  Section did not include the 
Special Investigations Committee. The self-regulatory  program relied com-
pletely on peer review for  the improvement of  audit practice, supplemented, of 
course, by the Section's membership requirements. Peer review was an 
adaptation of  the internal inspection programs utilized within many firms  to 
assist them in maintaining a uniformly  high quality of  audit work throughout 
what, in some cases, was a dispersed and decentralized practice. 
One of  the first  matters identified  by the Section's Executive Committee 
for  consultation with its Public Oversight Board related to the action to be taken 
by the Section with respect to an alleged or possible audit failure  by a member 
firm.  What investigative activity might or should the Section undertake and 
what possible disciplinary action should be imposed? To provide you with a 
basis for  appreciating the sensitivity of  this issue, let me take a few  minutes to 
discuss litigation from  the viewpoint of  a CPA firm. 
The Litigation Problem 
With exceptions so rare as to be nearly nonexistent, no one sets out to do a 
bad audit. Professional  opinions differ  as to the amount of  audit work required 
under varying sets of  conditions, judgments with respect to the propriety of 
accounting methods, provisions, and estimates are not always the same, and 
the work is often  performed,  unavoidably, under pressures of  time, client 
concern, and plain old uncertainty. Consequently, there is almost no audit that is 
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completely secure from  criticism, no matter how diligent and professional  the 
effort. 
Combine these facts  with a legal system that permits class action suits 
proposing damages of  staggering amounts, and assessing joint and several 
liability so that the CPA firm  may be charged not only with the share of  any loss 
that its activities may have caused but with the entire loss, whoever was 
primarily at fault,  and accountants' concerns increase. Now recognize that 
litigation under our present legal system is an extremely complex undertaking 
with many factors  besides professional  performance  of  audit work in com-
pliance with established standards bearing on the outcome, and you can begin 
to comprehend in some small degree why CPA firms  resist every and any 
action, however otherwise desirable, that they believe will weaken their ability 
to defend  themselves in the face  of  litigation. 
Historically, the AICPA has taken the position that it should keep clear of 
litigation involving members unless the suit was perceived as a threat to the 
profession  as a whole. The rationale justifying  its position is that the legal 
system is fully  equipped to determine the validity of  allegations of  audit failure, 
and certainly far  better provided with mechanisms and means to protect the 
rights of  all parties to such a contest than could be any organization not 
possessing equal authority and means. Hence, possible charges of  ethical 
misconduct against members for  alleged audit failures  are held in abeyance as 
long as the member is involved in litigation. 
One more factor  requires consideration. At the time the SEC Practice 
Section was faced  with this problem, litigation against major CPA firms  was 
increasing in number and in financial  importance to the point where such actions 
were considered highly newsworthy. The financial  press, which had for  many 
years shown little interest in accounting, was then featuring  stories alleging 
audit failure  accompanied by substantial losses to investors and others, and 
some critics of  the profession  were crying for  stern reprisals. 
The POB Recommendation 
In brief,  these were the realities facing  the new SEC Practice Section and 
the Public Oversight Board when the Section addressed its question to the 
Board. What should the Section do in the way of  self-regulatory  measures when 
charges alleging audit failure  were filed  either in civil litigation or by a regulatory 
agency? The POB's response was prompt and to the point. The following 
words are taken from  the POB's annual report for  1979-80. 
After  extended study, the Board concluded that protection of  users of 
audited financial  statements should be the dominant consideration in any 
action taken by the Section with respect to a possible audit failure.  The 
Board recommended that a permanent committee be established to 
monitor, and to determine what action, if  any, should be taken with 
respect to alleged or possible audit failures  involving member firms. 
The principal purposes of  the committee and its monitoring efforts 
would be to determine whether facts  relating to any audit failure  indicate 
that auditing standards are inadequate or that the quality controls of  the 
member firm  need strengthening. In developing these primary pur-
poses, the Board concluded that disciplinary proceedings directed 
toward the punishment of  a member firm  were of  less immediate 
190 
importance, particularly in view of  the fact  that the firm  and individuals 
involved in an audit failure  would be facing  punitive and compensatory 
actions by governmental and regulatory bodies and by private litigants. 
Nonetheless, the Board recommended that the Section have the 
authority to institute formal  disciplinary proceedings in those circum-
stances where such action is deemed appropriate, notwithstanding the 
pendancy of  litigation or governmental action. 
The SIC—Composition and Operation 
The Section accepted the recommendation of  the Public Oversight Board 
and appointed a nine-member committee composed of  active and retired 
partners, all with extensive audit experience. By the rules of  the Section, 
member firms  are required to report litigation charging deficient  audit perfor-
mance to the Section within 30 days of  receiving notice of  such litigation. 
Accompanying this notice is a copy of  the official  complaint. Staff  members 
assigned to the Special Investigations Committee forward  copies of  the 
complaint to the members of  the committee and proceed to prepare a summary 
of  the case including the staffs  recommendations for  action by the Committee. 
Though few  in number, some cases are so without merit that no investiga-
tion is required. Rather the case is closed on staff  recommendation plus a 
reading of  the allegations and financial  statements by committee members. 
For most cases, the chairman of  the SIC at the next meeting assigns the 
case to a one or two-person task force  to work with the staff  in formulating  a 
recommendation to the committee. Working with the staff,  task force  members 
read the complaint, the relevant financial  statements and any press notices and, 
in case of  an investigation by a regulatory body, any available releases. They 
may also and frequently  do meet with representatives of  the firm  to learn how 
the firm  has responded to the charges, read the most recent peer review 
report on the firm's  quality controls, and may meet with members of  the peer 
review team to obtain additional information.  The task force  does not have the 
right under normal conditions to see the working papers or interview the staff 
members involved in the audit in question. In a few  instances, firms  have made 
personnel who participated in audits that are the subject of  litigation available to 
a task force,  but this is the exception rather than the rule. At the date of  this 
presentation, SIC members have no authority to "investigate" the case in 
litigation. Their concern is with the subject firm's  quality control system only. 
The Confidentiality  Requirement 
Two points deserve attention here. When the SIC was first  established, the 
profession's  concern for  litigation resulted in a requirement for  complete 
confidentiality  for  SIC activities. Members of  the committee are not to discuss 
matters under investigation with anyone other than committee members and 
members of  the staff  who serve the committee. No one attends committee 
meetings but its members' staff  and representatives of  the POB. Within a 
meeting, discussions are free  and open. The POB staff  keeps itself  and the 
POB members fully  informed  on developments as SIC inquiries proceed. Once 
the SIC has completed its work on a "case," all working papers and notes are 
destroyed. 
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Recall that the purpose of  the SIC investigation is not to try the case; that is 
left  to the judicial system. Its purpose is to determine, first,  whether the 
professional  literature is lacking in instructional material to aid professionals  in 
responding to similar circumstances; second, to discover whether weaknesses 
exist in the design of  or compliance with the quality control system of  the firm 
involved. Neither of  these purposes, at this time, is considered to require 
access to the audit work papers of  the case under litigation or to the personnel 
involved in that audit. 
Confidentiality  and SEC Oversight 
The Securities and Exchange Commission is charged by the Congress with 
responsibility for  oversight of  the CPA profession.  In meeting that responsibil-
ity, the SEC staff  has access on a stratified  random sample basis to selected 
peer review working papers and to the working papers of  the POB staff 
resulting from  its peer review oversight activities. The SEC does not have 
access to SIC working papers nor to the working papers of  the POB staff  in the 
performance  of  its oversight with respect to the activities of  the SIC. The SEC 
staff  takes the position that without some access to SIC activities, it is 
foreclosed  from  formulating  any valid conclusion as to the effectiveness  of  that 
committee. The SEC staff  has refused  to accept unsupported statements from 
the POB that the SIC is functioning  effectively  and well. Time after  time we 
have been told that if  the SIC is ever to be accepted as an effective  part of  the 
self-regulatory  program, some way must be found  to provide the SEC with 
more access than it now has. That would constitute a breach of  confidentiality 
that the member firms  have not as yet been willing to accept. Negotiations are 
still in process. It seems inevitable that a solution to this impasse be found  if  the 
self-regulatory  program is to be fully  accepted. 
SIC Courses of  Action 
In the original organization document for  the Special Investigations Commit-
tee, provision was made for  an initial investigation of  the implications of  the case 
that could be followed  by (a) a continuing monitoring of  the case for  subsequent 
developments, (b) an investigation of  the firm,  or (c) an investigation of  the 
case. Monitoring was utilized when it appeared that the investigations of  a 
regulatory body of  some kind might produce information  relevant to the 
committee's final  decision and not otherwise available to the SIC. When the 
information  available to the committee was such that there appeared a strong 
likelihood that the firm's  quality control system had not been effective,  the 
committee could call for  a special investigation of  the firm's  quality controls. 
This might run to a review of  the firm's  quality controls with respect to a given 
industry, a given office  or offices,  or the work of  specific  professional 
personnel. Just what an "investigation of  a case" might entail was not clear. 
Not long after  it began operation, the committee found  it necessary to 
undertake a limited number of  investigations of  firms  (which soon came to be 
referred  to as "special reviews"). A number of  these have now occurred. 
Needless to say, no firm  desired to be the first  one investigated by the SIC and 
to this day, no firm  seems to welcome a special review. They do occur, 
however, and I will describe their results in a moment. 
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No investigation of  a case took place, however, and none has to date. As the 
committee acquired experience with these matters and as the philosophy of 
self-regulation  developed, the members of  the SIC became convinced that they 
could perform  their function  satisfactorily  without ever undertaking an investi-
gation of  a case. That is, their purposes, as stated above, could be met with 
special reviews directed at the firm's  activities in a given industry, or at the 
functioning  of  specific  offices  or personnel, without going directly to a case in 
litigation. That is where the matter stands at this time. 
Effect  of  a Special Review 
What results from  a special review? First, consider the obvious fact  that the 
self-interest  of  any firm  is best served by bringing damage control to bear on a 
problem as rapidly as possible. Contrary to the apparent expectations of  some 
critics, this does not consist solely of  employing the best legal talent available, 
although that may be necessary. If  there is a weakness in a firm's  quality 
control, it must be repaired immediately or additional damage may occur. If  that 
weakness is one of  personnel rather than system, repairs are still necessary. 
This may involve transfers  of  personnel, other changes of  assignment, 
remedial training, improved supervision, or, in some cases, termination of 
employment. 
In most cases, by the time an SIC review of  a firm  has been mounted, the 
firm  has already taken measures to shore up its system of  quality control. 
Where this has not yet occurred, recommendations by the SIC are unequivocal 
and are followed  up to assure that whatever the deficiency  in quality control 
was, it no longer constitutes a threat to the public that relies on the firm's  audit 
opinions. 
Professional  Acceptance of  the SIC 
How has the work of  the Special Investigations Committee been accepted 
by the members of  the SEC Practice Section? At the beginning, it met with 
very mixed enthusiasm. There was general recognition among the member 
firms  that something of  the sort was needed. The attention being given to 
allegedly unsatisfactory  audits demanded that the profession  have a mechanism 
for  dealing with them, and there was more than a suspicion within the 
profession  that strengthened audit procedures were both possible and needed. 
But when your own firm  is the one threatened with the need for  and the cost of 
a special review, then the "dedication" of  the SIC bordered on "over-
zealousness." With time, however, and the necessity of  responding in writing 
to the findings  and recommendations of  a special review, there has come a 
reluctant but general recognition that the SIC is a necessary and useful  part of 
the self-regulatory  program. 
SIC Procedures 
What happens at a meeting of  that committee? After  some preliminaries by 
the chairman and the senior staff  member present, generally designed to bring 
the committee members up to date on developments within the Institute and 
the Section that bear on the work of  the Committee, the chairman leads into an 
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organized discussion of  the cases on the committee's agenda. Each member 
assigned to serve as or on a task force  reports on activities concerning that 
case since the last meeting. That activity may have been a discussion with firm 
representatives, with the leader of  the team for  the most recent peer review, 
or, in the case of  a special review, a visit to an office  to supervise the review of 
quality controls and audit work papers. The intent in reporting is to convey to 
the rest of  the committee the understanding acquired by the committee 
member so that when he offers  a motion either to close the case, to monitor it, 
or to initiate a special review, the rest of  the committee will be in agreement. 
Some cases are closed rather quickly because the allegations are so general 
as to have no real meaning and the review of  the financial  statements in 
question shows no deficiencies  related in any way to the allegations. Others 
remain open for  some time while a variety of  inquiries take place and the 
committee member assigned satisfies  himself  that he has learned everything 
necessary to make a reasonable and supportable recommendation to the 
committee. 
Quality of  SIC Activity 
How satisfactory  is the work of  the committee as an essential part of  the 
self-regulatory  program? Overall, I regard it as an essential feature  of  that 
program. SIC work is generally of  very high quality. The astuteness and 
dedication of  the chairman, the quality of  the staff,  and the support of  the 
section's membership are all important. Ultimately, however, the work is done 
and the recommendations are made by the members of  the committee. Any 
committee of  nine members selected from  different  firms  and possessing 
different  backgrounds of  experience and authority will experience some 
unevenness in its work as those members undertake their assignments. The 
chairman and the staff  can do much to overcome shortfalls  in diligence and 
pursuit, but not all. 
The committee has been blessed with high quality members and with some 
whose concern for  the profession  is genuine and apparently limitless. I continue 
to be impressed at what people who love and respect their profession  and have 
high standards can accomplish in making others aware of  the necessity and the 
opportunity to bring about change. 
A Personal Evaluation 
I attend almost all SIC meetings and occasionally participate in task force 
meetings with firm  representatives. I think of  SIC members as secret heroes. 
Questioning fellow  practitioners from  other firms  about the quality of  their 
work is seldom pleasant and can be very difficult.  Refusing  to accept ready 
answers, penetrating to the heart of  possible failures,  hanging on to a line of 
questioning until satisfactory  answers are received are far  from  easy. And all 
this must be done with the utmost confidentiality.  There is no discussing one's 
work with one's partners. SIC members received few  plaudits; there is no fan 
club. But those who have served a term on that committee and have performed 
to the best of  their ability have made an important contribution to the well being 
and to the environment of  the profession,  and they have strengthened the self-
regulatory progam immeasurably. 
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